Abstract
Introduction
People who contribute to public goods or to common projects are, generally speaking, not alike. They differ, for instance, in their talents, skills, and qualifications. In some cases, heterogeneous abilities are even necessary to achieve a common goal. Naturally, the question arises of how group heterogeneity affects contributions to joint projects. This article examines the voluntary contribution behaviors of individuals with heterogeneous abilities using laboratory experiments.
Differences in individual capacities within a group, e.g., between citizens in a society or team members, might stimulate voluntary contributions from those whose special abilities are desperately needed. For instance, after the devastating Kobe earthquake in Japan in 1995, local transportation systems in the town of Kobe were paralyzed. Bicycling became a vital means of transportation. The serious problem then became that many bicycles broke and were left unrepaired due to a lack of the necessary equipment and expertise to fix the damage. To help the people in Kobe, a number of bicycle enthusiasts from all over Japan came to Kobe voluntarily and offered much-needed assistance with repairing the broken bicycles.
On the other hand, heterogeneous abilities can become an obstacle when soliciting effort to accomplish common projects, as exemplified by the legal dispute among musicians in the Beethoven Orchestra in Bonn. The musicians cooperating to perform a common musical program are heterogeneous with respect to many factors, including the instruments they play, the (number of) notes they play during a given piece of music, and the amount of time they must spend practicing in joint rehearsals before a performance.
However, under the unionized contracts of orchestra musicians in Germany, all orchestra members are guaranteed equal payment regardless of the particular instrument they play. In March 2004, the violinists of the Beethoven Orchestra demanded higher pay on the grounds that they have to rehearse more than musicians playing other instruments. 1 The other musicians, particularly soloists, argued that they were subject to more pressure than the violinists, so receiving the same pay for less rehearsal time seemed to be justified. 2 The above examples capture two general considerations relevant to the voluntary contribution behavior of individuals with heterogeneous abilities.
On one hand, heterogeneity between group members might evoke different contribution norms. On the other hand, the appropriate contribution norm may depend on the context in which the heterogeneity is perceived. In the case of the Kobe earthquake, the norm called for help from persons who were knowledgable about bicycle repair. The conflicting views between soloists and violinists in the Bonn orchestra suggest that violinists consider equal remuneration of nominal work hours to be an appropriate norm, while soloists seem to favor remuneration according to effective contribution, which takes into account other factors (responsibility, stress, etc.) . What kind of norm is considered appropriate thus depends on the circumstances and is an empirical question.
The experimental literature has studied contribution norms and behavior in the context of voluntary contribution mechanisms for homogeneous groups extensively (see Ledyard (1995) for a survey). In a classical linear voluntary contribution mechanism, group members receive an endowment from which they can invest in a group project with an outcome that is shared equally amongst all members at the end of the project. The marginal return for each member of one unit contributed to the group project by any member is what the literature has termed the marginal per capita return. To assess the effect of this marginal return on contributions, some studies compare homogeneous groups that differ in their marginal returns (e.g., Isaac and Walker (1998) ). One main result of these studies is that groups with higher marginal returns have an increased propensity to contribute. This finding seems to be robust across studies and for different marginal returns and numbers of group members.
Only a few studies have examined heterogeneous groups in which members vary in their marginal returns. 3 Fisher et al. (1995) and Tan (2008) compare the type specific behavior of heterogeneous groups consisting of members with high and low marginal returns to that of homogeneous groups.
Within heterogeneous groups, both studies find that individuals whose contributions have higher marginal returns to the public good tend to have a higher propensity to contribute than do members of the same group with lower marginal returns. These results seem to suggest that efficiency concerns prevail in controlled laboratory studies. However, in these studies, the contributor benefits from his or her own contribution; hence, contributions of high types are not only more efficient but also less costly for the donor.
High types might therefore contribute more either because they can better advance the joint project or because their costs of contribution are low.
The present study investigates the effect of the first of these two factors on contributions, which we will refer to as "productivity." The literature on distributive justice has suggested different fair contribution and sharing rules (Konow (2003) ). Based on this literature, we motivate three plausible social norms, namely an equal nominal contribution, an equal effective contribution, and an efficient contribution norm, that we examine experimentally. To do so, first we introduce heterogeneity by allowing the marginal returns of individual contributions to vary between two types, a low and a high productivity type, in a standard linear voluntary contribution mechanism while maintaining symmetry of costs among group members. Second, we vary the level of information about heterogeneity in three different treatments. In the baseline treatment, group members are informed about their own marginal returns as well as about individual nominal contributions of others. In the other two treatments, participants are additionally informed about the marginal returns of the other productivity type. Additionally, in the third treatment, participants also know which productivity type made a particular contribution. This design allows us to control the extent to which individuals know about heterogeneity, and hence, it provides restrictions on the contribution norms that can be applied. In this way we aim to discriminate between different contribution norms and to examine the joint effect of a heterogeneous environment and information on voluntary contributions.
Our findings can be summarized as follows: When individuals are made aware of the heterogeneity in productivity, the average propensity to contribute increases. However, the information structure evokes different relative contribution patterns between types, resulting in no conclusive support for any one particular contribution norm. The less information that is avail-able, the more equal contribution norms prevail; the more information that is available, the more efficient contribution norms take over. The information about heterogeneity affects contribution behavior differently depending on productivity type. Public information about heterogeneity in productivity within a group increases individual contributions almost exclusively for low types, who contribute more than high types, whereas the latter do not change their contribution behavior compared to the no information benchmark. More detailed feedback information on the contributor's type induces high types to contribute more and, at the same time, low types to lower their contributions compared to the situation with partial information.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model of our voluntary contribution mechanism and presents behavioral motives to contribute. Section 3 describes the experimental design, explains how information about heterogeneity is varied across treatments and presents the behavioral predictions. Section 4 gives an overview of the stated contribution norms and aggregated contribution behavior. Section 5 presents a dynamic analysis of individual contribution behavior. Section 6 discusses our results in the light of the literature and section 7 concludes.
The model 2.1 The linear voluntary contribution mechanism
In order to introduce heterogeneity in the economic environment, we augment the standard linear model of the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). First, we introduce a productivity factor for each group member to reflect heterogeneity in individuals' ability to produce the public good. The joint project in a group with members can be written as:
where is an individual's nominal contribution to the group project and denotes the individual's productivity. Each group member has either high or low productivity, i.e., ∈ { , } for all ∈ {1, . . . , }. We will refer to individuals with high productivity as H -types, and those with low productivity as L-types. Any unit contributed to the joint project is efficient but units of H -types progress the group project further, i.e., 1 < < . The effective contribution of each group member to the joint project therefore depends on two factors: the individual nominal contribution ( ) and the individual productivity ( ). We consider a group that is composed of an equal number of H -types and L-types.
Second, we ensure identical pecuniary incentives to contribute across all group members as follows: the payoff of individual from the public good is independent of 's contribution. In other words, each individual does not benefit from his or her own contribution but receives a share of the output generated by the contributions of only the other group members. Additionally, the contribution of one other member with different productivity is excluded from the public good pool, so that each subject benefits from a public good pool provided by a balanced number of individuals of both productivity types. The payoff of an individual with an endowment resulting from the interaction in a group with members can be written as
Each group member benefits from the amount allocated to the own account ( − ) and the returns from the joint project, where
The following are the novel features of our model. First, unlike in the standard VCM, group members are excluded from the returns generated by their own contributions. This is necessary because, otherwise, H -types not only advance the joint project more but also benefit from their own contributions more than L-types do, resulting in two motivations to give:
higher efficiency and lower costs of contributing. Excluding members from benefiting from their own contribution keeps contribution costs constant across types and prevents the described confound. Second, group members nevertheless face a symmetrical payoff structure: every individual benefits only from contributions of an equal number of both productivity types. One unit contributed by group member increases the public good, hence, the total payoff of the other group members by , because
From this it follows that group member will contribute to the public good as long as his marginal utility gain is sufficiently high so that it satisfies the following first-order condition,
Therefore, when individuals are altruistic or concerned about social efficiency and their marginal utility in others' payoff is either constant or decreasing, H -types will, on average, contribute more than L-types. Because 1 < < , it is easier for H -types than for L-types to satisfy condition (2). Being concerned about what is socially optimal can be a norm based on the understanding that "people often seek to maximize surplus, sometimes at a personal cost, and that this goal is regarded as 'fair'." (Konow (2003) , p.1205). We will refer to this norm hereafter as the efficient contribution norm.
Second, when group members observe nominal contributions of others ( ), norms concerning equity may play a role in determining individual levels of contribution to a public good. The proportionality principle is often used as a measure of equity (see Konow (2003) for a more general discussion of justice theories). This principle suggests that an individual's benefit from a joint project should be in proportion to the degree to which a person contributed to the project. Because in VCMs, benefits from public goods are shared equally among group members, according to the proportionality principle, all individuals are expected to contribute equally. When group members differ in their productivity, equity depends on the way individual contributions are evaluated. Thereby, contributions might be evaluated with reference either to nominal units of endowment contributed ( ) or to their 'effective' impact on the joint project ( ). Hereafter we will refer to these norms as the equal nominal contribution norm and the equal effective contribution norm, respectively.
It is important to note that if the reference point of the proportionality principle is nominal contributions, then group members' knowledge about heterogeneity in the group will have no influence on contribution behavior.
On the other hand, effective contributions can only be used as a reference point when there is sufficient information about heterogeneity in a population. Therefore, the intensity with which different reference points of the proportionality principle can come into play depends on the level of information that group members have about the productivity of others.
We vary the information groups have about the productivity of their 8 members to investigate if behavior is shaped by efficiency concerns or proportional fairness and, for the latter case, which reference point is used. For instance, if persons act according to a contribution norm that has nominal contribution levels as a reference point, H -types and L-types would make the same nominal contributions regardless of whether members are aware of differences in productivity within their group. Similarly, behavior should not change with the level of information when group members are only concerned about altruism or efficiency. In this case, H -types would contribute more on average than L-types regardless of the information they possess about the difference in productivity.
If individuals make their contribution decisions according to a contribution norm with reference to effective contributions, however, such norms cannot come into play without sufficient information about the heterogeneity within the group. In this case, contribution behavior will differ depending on whether the information about heterogeneity in productivity is public.
More precisely, without information, the reference point remains that of equal nominal contributions, whereas when information about heterogeneity is public, L-types will contribute (nominally) more than H -types, resulting in equal effective contributions of both types.
3 The experiment
Design and procedure
In light of the different contribution motives, what norm is adopted in heterogeneous environments is -a priori-not clear. Therefore, we need to rely on empirical evidence to study the norms that are prevalent in heterogeneous environments. To provide such empirical evidence, we conducted a public good experiment. In the experiment, members of a group had to decide how to divide their private endowment between a private account and a group project. The nominal contributions of each member to the group project were public information. The treatment variable in our experiment, the level of information, varies in two ways: first, subjects either do or do not receive precise information on the distribution of productivity types within the group, and second, the feedback information about the contributions of all group members does or does not reveal each contributor's type. In particular, we study three treatments with the following information scenar-ios. In the No-info treatment, group members know their own productivity, but not the distribution of types within their group. In the Part-info and
Full-info treatments, the distribution of types is explicitly stated in the instructions. Additionally, the feedback information in the Full-info treatment allows members to link an individual contribution to the contributor's type.
In sum, the three treatments gradually change the level of information about the heterogeneity in the population and contributions by different types.
Each information treatment comprised nine groups. Each group con- The order of individual contributions in the history table was randomized so that contributions could not be attributed to a specific group member.
Prior to the beginning of the first period and after the exposition of the instructions, subjects were asked once to state a contribution norm, i.e., what they think is appropriate to contribute, and to predict the average contribution of others. 6 After the experiment, participants completed a standard personality test. 7 A sample copy of the instructions is included in 4 The two productivity values were chosen with respect to the parameters used in previous research on heterogenous marginal per capita returns (MPCR). For instance, the two MPCRs used in Fisher et al. (1995) were 0.3 and 0.75, implying that a one-unit contribution by a low (high) MPCR type generates 1.2 (3) units of public goods in groups with four members. Therefore, the MPCR values used in Fisher et al. (1995) are comparable to the productivity factors of 1.33 and 3.99 used in our design.
5 Experimental earnings were counted in points and exchanged at the end of the experiment for Euros, where 80 points corresponded to 1 Euro. 6 We were only interested in the answers to the question about the normative behavior and asked the two questions so that participants could distinguish between normative and anticipated behavior. This is important because contribution norms and the anticipated behavior of others might not necessarily coincide. As contribution norms cannot be incentivized, participants were not paid for these answers. We also refrained from providing incentives for predictions.
7 We used the official German translation of the revised version of the Sixteen Per- 
Behavioral predictions
In light of the norms discussed in section 2.2 and our experimental design, we expected the following behavior in our experiment.
(i) Efficient contributions norm:
If individuals are concerned about others' payoff and social efficiency, both types will contribute to the joint project, with H -types contributing on average more than L-types. The level of information that group members have about the heterogeneity in productivity within the group, will have no influence on contribution levels (0 < < in all treatments).
by 
Data: Stated Norms and Contributions
In this section, we report stated norms and contributions aggregated over the 15 periods of the experiment. We first evaluate the contribution norms and actual contributions in light of our behavioral predictions. Second, we examine social welfare as observed in the experiment.
Stated private contribution norms and contributions by type
Contribution norms can be classified into two types, social and private contribution norms. Social contribution norms are constructed and fortified by social interaction. In contrast, private norms may be held by individuals prior to any social interaction. It is therefore natural to think that participants may have entered this experiment with their own private norms. In order to study these norms, we elicited participants' private norms for nominal contributions after introducing them to the details of the experiment, but before they started interacting with each other. 10
10 We elicited private norms in the No-info treatment using the question "What transfer to the project do you think is appropriate?" In the other two treatments the following two questions were asked: "What transfer to the project do you think is appropriate for a person whose productivity factor is 1.33?" and "What transfer to the project do you think is appropriate for a person whose productivity factor is 3.99?" These questions allowed and by productivity type. Both types in the No-info treatment make the same contributions to the joint project (7.00). In the treatments in which information is provided, both types contribute at least as much as in the No-info treatment. Additionally, in the Part-info treatment, the median Ltype contributes more (10.00) than the median H -type (9.00). Furthermore, although the median contribution of both types is the same in the Full-info treatment (8.00), the interquartile range is much larger for H -types (10.00 vs. 5.00 for L-types), indicating a wider dispersion of their contributions.
us to identify normative expectations separately for contributions of L-types and H -types and to evaluate how those norms vary by type.
11 Unless indicated otherwise, we refer to nominal contributions. 12 Note that participants in the No-info treatment were not aware of the heterogeneity in the group. Therefore, the contribution norms stated by H -types are taken as reflecting norms for H -types. The same holds for L-types. 13 We compared norms stated by different persons using a two-sided non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (hereafter referred to as "WMW-test") for two independent samples. WMW tests: No-info vs. Part-info: H -types: = 0.75 and L-types: = 0.77. We find the same results when conditioning on the respondent's own type.
14 For the comparison of contribution norms for different types within the Part-info and Full-info treatments, we used a two-sided non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test (hereafter referred to as "W-test") for matched pairs. The preceding analysis aggregated contributions over time into a single median observation per group. Though necessary for appropriate nonparametric testing, it thereby neglects information contained in the data.
The lack of significant variation in the analysis of aggregated data is therefore not surprising. It is, however, natural to think that information exerts its effect in the dynamics of the interaction throughout the course of the experiment. To develop a more detailed account of the effect of heterogeneity, or more precisely, of the extent to which heterogeneity in productivity is common information in a group, we examine the dynamics of contribution behavior over time in the following section. 
Empirical model specification
We describe the proportion that individual contributes from his or her own endowment in period , ★ , as the function: 
Given the design of the experiment, individual contributions to the joint project are doubly censored, first at the lowest contribution level of 0 units and second at the highest contribution level of 17 units, the period endowment. 18 We therefore use a standard regression doubly censored Tobit model to estimate the relation for the latent contribution proportions ★ described in model (4) with
Results
Baseline: specification 1
We estimate two specifications of the model in equation (4). Both specifications include the same set of background characteristics, but vary in the way time effects are modeled. In specification 1, the time trend is modeled nonparametrically by including dummy variables for each period ( ( ) = 1 with 1 being an indicator function for period for > 1 and (1) = 0).
Estimation results are reported in Table 2 .
The first thing to note from the results of specification 1 is that group Other parameter estimates are presented in Table 3 in Appendix C.
Time and treatment interaction effects: specification 2
In a second specification, we model the time trend as a quadratic function including interaction effects with productivity and information: 19 Part-info, Full-info) . (6) This allows us to account for both non-linear effects of periods and interactions with the different treatments while minimizing the loss of degrees of freedom. Estimation results are presented in Table 2 . The detailed time function is given by: reject the null hypothesis of no effect throughout periods 1 to 12.
The other four panels illustrate the case for the treatments with more information. In contrast to the No-info treatment, we observe that contributions of both types are not monotonically declining but rather parabolic, depicting the tendency for average contributions to increase initially before following the standard pattern of decay. Furthermore, from the lower middle and lower right panels, we learn that contribution behavior differs significantly between the two types and also between the Part-info and the
Full-info treatments indicating the extent to which types respond differently
to the information about heterogeneity.
The upper and lower middle panels illustrate behavior in the Part-info treatment. There, we observe L-types contributing between 5% and 10% more of their endowments than H -types. The findings so far support our behavioral prediction (iii.1) with behavior that goes in the direction of equal effective contributions. According to our prediction (iii.2), we expected be- On the other hand, in the Full-info treatment, we observe contribution behavior that is opposite to the behavior observed in the Part-info treatment, providing evidence for the efficient contribution norm.
Given this mixed evidence, we conclude that individuals do not react solely to their own productivity, nor do equal contribution norms persist in the presence of sufficient information on heterogeneity. Second, efficient contributions emerge when information is provided within a group about individuals' characteristics and contribution behavior. Third, the information structure affects types differently.
Discussion
The present experiment was designed to investigate the impact of productivity isolated from costs of contribution. Therefore, we excluded subjects from the returns of their own contributions. This is quite different from the standard experimental public goods literature, in which a person always benefits from his or her own contribution (see Ledyard (1995) for a survey).
Despite this difference in design, in agreement with findings in this literature, we found positive contributions to the joint project and a common decay in contributions over time.
There are few studies in the literature on public goods experiments that examine groups whose members vary in the marginal returns that a contributed unit generates for themselves and others, also referred to as MPCR ("marginal per capita return") (Fisher et al. (1995) and Tan (2008) ). In these experiments, group members receive the marginal returns of their own contributions. As a consequence, contributions of members with high productivity are less costly for the donor. Our experimental design allows us to isolate the effect of productivity on contributions; hence, our results complement the findings of those studies.
In Tan, the same groups of four persons participate in three subsequent treatments. Her second treatment is comparable to our Full-info treatment.
There, half of the group is assigned a high MPCR (0.9) and the other half a low MPCR (0.3). She finds that members with a high MPCR contribute more than those with a low MPCR, a finding qualitatively similar to our results. In Fisher et al., two out of four group members have a high MPCR (0.75) and the other two a low MPCR (0.3). The same group members interact in two parts of ten periods each. After the first ten periods, members with a low MPCR are assigned a high MPCR and vice versa. In the first part of the first sessions they conducted, Fisher et al. observed behavior that they named "poisoning of the well" as high types contributed less than low types.
The difference in contributions between types was reversed in the second part, when high types contributed more than low types. These findings resemble the differences between our Part-info and Full-info treatments.
Given our results, we conjecture that their findings occurred due to the In those later sessions, the poisoning of the well effect disappeared. 21
The similarity of our results to those of Fisher et al. (1995) and Tan (2008) indicates that the same information structure leads to similar contribution patterns between types regardless of whether they have the same or different contribution costs. The findings in our experiment and the comparison with the literature underline the importance of the information structure. Therefore, we will conclude by discussing differences in behavioral responses to information by productivity type.
Reactions of types to information
In order to investigate how both types react to the provision of information about heterogeneity, we computed marginal effects. Results are presented in Figure 3 , with marginal effects of information about heterogeneity on the individual contribution behavior of H -types in the upper panels and of L-types in the lower panels. In conclusion, the apparent "poisoning of the well" effect reported by Fisher et al. (1995) and replicated in our study is the joint result of divergent reactions of the two types. When there is (partial) information on hetero- 
Conclusions
This article studies the effects of heterogeneity in productivity on voluntary contribution behavior to a joint project using experimental data. We introduce heterogeneity in a standard linear voluntary contribution mechanism by varying the marginal products of individual contributions. In order to separate the effects of productivity from the costs of contribution, group members do not benefit from their own contributions. We use information as a treatment variable to distinguish between alternative plausible contribution norms. To this end, we gradually increase the level of information about heterogeneity in three treatments to control what subjects know about the heterogeneity.
An important finding of this study is that the information structure significantly affects individuals' contribution behavior when individuals differ in their productivity. Our analysis reveals that the information structure evokes different relative contribution patterns for the two types, resulting in no conclusive support for any particular contribution norm. The less information that is available, the more equal contribution norms prevail; but the more information that is available, the more efficient contribution norms take over.
Our findings outline the importance of the information structure con- All amounts are displayed in Points. The exchange rate is: 80 points = 1
Euro.
The experiment consists of two phases of 15 periods each. Before each phase, all participants are randomly assigned to groups of six. The group's composition remains the same throughout the experiment.
Detailed Information
You are a member of a group of six. At the beginning of each period, every group member receives 17 points. In every period each group member decides how to split the 17 points. You can transfer points to a private account or to a group project. Your period payoff is the sum of your income from the private account and the income from the group project.
Your payoff from the private account:
For each point you transfer to the private account, you receive a payoff of one point. This means that if you transfer an amount of x points to your private account, your payoff increases by x points. Nobody except you benefits from your private account.
Your payoff from the group project:
The payoff you receive from the project is derived as follows. You receive one quarter of the project's outcome generated by four other members of your group. The project's outcome is the sum of all transfers, whereby each transfer to the project is multiplied by an individual factor[, either 1.33 or 3.99. Two of the four members of your group whose transfers will benefit you have a factor of 1.33, and the other two have a factor of 3.99. Individual factors were randomly assigned to each group member in the beginning of the experiment such that three members were assigned a factor of 1.33 and three were assigned a factor of 3.99. Each member retains the same factor throughout the whole experiment.] 22 The payoffs are calculated in the same manner for all six group members.
Each point you transfer to the group project generates 3.99 points. 23
Please note that four other members of your group benefit from your transfer to the project, but you do not.
One period proceeds as follows:
In each period, you receive 17 points. You decide how many of your 17 points to transfer to your private account and how many to the project.
You will make this decision by simply deciding how many points you wish to transfer to the project. The points you transfer to your private account are automatically calculated as the difference of the 17 points and the points you transferred to the project. After every group member has made a decision, the payoff for this period is calculated.
At the end of each period, you will receive the following information:
• The number of points that each member in your group transferred to the project (Please note that the numbers of points are listed in random order, i.e. the sequence of transfers is different in each period.)
• Your payoff from the private account
• Your payoff from the project
• Your payoff from the period
• Your total payoff from all previous periods in this phase Then, the next period will start. In the second period, you will be shown a In total, you will interact over 15 periods in each phase. You will receive more detailed information on phase 2 after phase 1 ends.
We will ask you to complete a questionnaire after the experiment is com- . We computed the effect in eq. (7) for all individuals who participated in the Full-info treatment and for each time period. We average over all individual effects 1/( ) ∑ ∀ , Δ , to obtain the total effect. The variance of the marginal effects, that was used to calculate the -values is simulated using 100 Halton draws (see Train (2003) and Judd (1999) Table 3 : Parameter estimates of background characteristics and, for specification 1, the time trend
